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Economic nationalism and foreign acquisition completion: the case of China 
 
Abstract: Extending institutional theory, we incorporate a neglected but important component of 
formal institution, economic nationalism, into a model that specifies its effects on cross-border 
acquisition success. We suggest that economic nationalism has a dynamic nature and sees the 
interaction between protectionism and liberalism. As such, it exerts both positive and negative effects 
on foreign investments, contingent on how these investments are perceived as aligned with the 
national interests as reflected by national security considerations, foreign relations, and growth 
strategy. Using a data set containing 7,275 announced cross-border acquisition deals in China during 
1985-2010, the study finds that (1) when an acquisition activity targets essential industries or 
state-owned enterprises, it is less likely to be completed because of provoked national economic 
security concerns; and (2) when an acquirer brings technology and/or capital, or/and helps to 
restructure poorly-performing firms, or/and the acquirer comes from a country with good foreign 
relations with China, the acquisition is considered as safe and helpful for the country’s development, 
and it is more likely to be completed. 
 
Key words: economic nationalism, institutional theory, cross-border acquisition, foreign direct 
investment policy, China.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has become one of the most important phenomena in 
international business (IB) as part of the rising globalization. Meanwhile, the world also witnesses an 
upsurge of nationalism across countries, which has emerged as one of the main issues confronting the 
world (Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller, & Melewar, 2001). These two forces are intertwined: 
nationalistic sentiments grow as a reaction to the instabilities/benefits created by globalization, and 
economic nationalism greatly impacts foreign firms’ market entry and operations. Inbound 
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acquisitions are not free from the growing influence of economic nationalism of host countries as 
exemplified by recent cases. In 2005 the state-owned CNOOC’s bid for Unocal as part of the China 
Goes Global policy was vetoed by the USA Congress due to national security concerns. In 2007 SEB, 
a France-based corporation, who bid for Super, China’s largest manufacture of small appliances, saw 
severe oppositions from rivals in a fear of market monopoly when receiving approval by Chinese 
central government.  
Despite perceived importance (e.g., Dunning, 1998; 2009), the influence of economic nationalism on 
inbound M&A has received little empirical attention. Past acquisition success studies that build on the 
resource-based view (RBV) and transaction cost analysis (TCA) largely focus on the features of the 
deals and the entrants, their resources and capabilities in particular, that enable them to reduce costs 
and achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Anand & Delios, 2002; Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984). Recent development suggests that a firm’s international expansion is also enabled and 
constrained by the different institutions under which it operates (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & 
Zheng, 2007; Hoskisson, Eden & Wright, 2000; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002; 
Peng, 2002 & 2003; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005; Peng, Wang & Jiang 2008). In this 
line a few studies have examined the impact of institutions on cross-border acquisition, such as 
industrial regulatory factors (Muehlfeld, Sahib, & Witteloostuijn, 2007), institutional quality of hosts 
(Zhang, Zhou & Ebbers, 2011), and institutional distance (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010).  
Despite this advancement, one of the key institutional factors, economic nationalism as an important 
antecedent to cross-border acquisition (in)completion remains under-researched in political science 
and economics (Baughn & Yaprak, 1996) and IB literatures. In the former, “the concept of economic 
nationalism is relatively unexplored, and seems to fall in the interstices between separate disciplinary 
interests and concerns” (Burnell, 1986: 16). Economic nationalism and its impact have not been 
adequately examined by economic theory as well (Pickel, 2002).  
In IB studies, the traditional OLI paradigm tends to focus on how national/regional characteristics 
determine MNEs’ location choice to access or exploit their O-specific advantages (Dunning, 1998; 
2009), including the host’s institutions (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010) such as the nationalistic 
policies (Dunning, 2009). OLI wisdom stresses the international value-chain allocation, for example 
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the MNEs’ preference for less protectionist locations even when they process the institutional 
ownership advantages (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010). This paper has a different angle by 
drawing on institutional theory and focusing on the likelihood to complete the intended M&A when 
the FDI location has been chosen. This approach and empirical work therefore add to OLI wisdom 
because they provide measured effects by a set of very important institutions upon the possibility of 
inward FDI in the form of M&A to have successful completion. The favorable institutions including 
nationalistic attitudes towards foreign investments as revealed in our empirical work could be counted 
as one of the locational factors. 
Many writers for practical journals have noted that foreign investors have to take nationalism in host 
countries seriously when entering and operating in these areas such as China
1
 (e.g., Economy & 
Lieberthal, 2007; Paine, 2010; Vanhonacker, 1997). Although it is a common sense that nationalism 
impacts FDI, but the literature fails to see an empirical study concerning the extent to which it affects 
the completion of inbound M&As. As UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2011 notes, although 
liberalizing investment policy measures taken globally in 2010 outnumbered restrictive measures, 
however “(w)ithout the benefit of statistics, investors might have drawn the opposite conclusion, 
witnessing what appears to be a rising tide of national resistance to foreign takeovers” (see Walker, 
2012 in Columbia FDI Perspectives). Thus an investigation into the precise impact of economic 
nationalism is timely. 
Besides, economic nationalism as a crucial institutional factor may do better than the over simplified 
dichotomy of liberalism and protectionism in explaining business activities and performance from a 
broader sense, given that it may take either perspectives depending on the then national interests and 
conditions (Helleiner, 2002; Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). 
Economic nationalism is an important issue that MNEs need to address when expanding into a foreign 
market and seeking to gain legitimacy (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010; Hanon, 1996; Zaheer, 
1995). Foreign invested companies, compared with indigenous entities, are expected to be more prone 
to and amenable to pursuing firm-specific, rather than national economic interests, which do not 
                                                        
1 We thank one of the reviewer for bringing Dunning’s and other practical work to our attention. 
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always align with the host’s national interests (Kim, 2007). Foreign investors may be perceived as 
having different philosophies regarding sustainability, labor, and industrial policies, which may 
conflict the public goals favored by the host. A host government develops and employs formal 
institutions such as industrial policies, technology boost policies, FDI policies and foreign policies to 
ensure the national interests. Firms that attempt to defy these institutional factors risk losing 
legitimacy and, hence, failure in that market (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). These institutions will 
certainly influence the fate of inward FDI projects, i.e., the failed CNOOC’s bid for Unocal in 2005 
and Coca-Cola’s bid for Huiyuan Juice in 2008. However, these influences have not been sufficiently 
explored by academia.  
In this research we seek to answer several important questions. For example, whether and how do 
cross-border acquirers see more interactions of protectionism and liberalism than their domestic 
counterparts? How do targets’ and their industrial attributes (i.e., ownership, FDI percentage, 
technological development level, capital demandingness, and performance level) as through the 
economic nationalism forces influence the cross-border acquisition success? And how does the 
evolution of regulations in light of the nationalism impact cross-border acquisitions? Answering these 
questions provides a number of contributions to the literature. First, it expands the institutional theory 
by indicating the important but under-researched and dynamic role played by economic nationalism in 
FDI arena. It also adds to the OLI paradigm by providing the empirical study of a set of specific 
institutions that will impact MNEs’ locational choice. Second, it adds new insights to FDI research by 
providing measured extent to which economic nationalism dynamically influences inbound M&A 
completion. Third, it is also beneficial to MNEs by bringing them cautions of the influential economic 
nationalism that may substantially increase liability of foreignness and costs (Zaheer, 1995). 
In line with the call that IB study should be interdisciplinary (Cantwell & Brannen; 2011), we draw on 
both IB and political science literature (e.g. Baughn & Yaprak, 1996; Johnson, 1965). We offer a 
conceptual model incorporating five economic nationalism policy elements, including national 
security, foreign relations, industrial policy, technology policy, and FDI policy, into a preliminary 
model that specifies the influences of dynamic interaction between protectionism and liberalism of 
economic nationalism on cross-border acquisition completion. We empirically tested the model with a 
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data set containing 7,275 announced cross-border acquisition deals in China across 1985-2010. To 
further verify the effect of the economic nationalism, we carried out additional estimations by using 
domestic M&A data, which included 17,654 domestic acquisitions that occurred during the period of 
1990-2010. We conclude with a discussion of the results, and the implications and directions for 
further research. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
Economic nationalism has been widely misinterpreted as an ideology associated with ‘protectionism’ 
fending off foreign MNEs (in favor of domestic ownership) in areas like political economy (Baughn & 
Yaprak, 1996; Dicken, 2007; Helleiner, 2002) and IB (i.e., Buckley & Ghauri, 2004), and with 
nationalistic sentiments and ethnocentricity in marketing (e.g., Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller & 
Melewar, 2001). However, there are contrasting differences between these two terms. Economic 
nationalism is a dynamic concept. The natural of economic nationalism is to ensure a nation’s 
economic development and sovereignty (Gilpin, 1987). Its definition “must be modified from one of 
protecting domestic capital from foreign capital to leveraging local resources for extracting economic 
benefits from the global economy” (D’Costa, 2009: 622). Many nationalist goals such as the 
promotion of the national unity, identity and autonomy are pursued through a variety of economic 
policies that often include free trade and investment in light of economic liberalism ( D’Costa, 2009; 
Helleiner, 2002; Pickel, 2002; Shulman, 2000) to help a country obtain “power, prestige, or 
prosperity” (Helleiner, 2002: 310). Many New Industrial Economies and Emerging Economies have 
intervened on nationalist grounds to strategically exploit opportunities available in the global economy, 
contrasting to their past protectionist gestures (e.g. Amsden, 1989; Johnson, 1982; Gold, 1986; 
D’Costa, 2009). Therefore protectionism and liberalism work together, which to dominate is 
contingent on what is perceived to be beneficial to the national interests in a particular time period. 
Following Helleiner (2002) we define economic nationalism as a form of nationalistic ideology 
associated with various economic policies.  
Economic nationalism is a crucial aspect of the home country’s institutions (Beland & Lecours, 2005), 
which can greatly facilitate or constrain foreign investors’ FDI (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010). 
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North (1990) defines institutions as the humanly devised constrains that structure human interaction, 
and include both informal (e.g. ideas, attitude) and formal forces (e.g., policies, regulations) (Zaheer, 
1995). Scott (1995) suggests that institutions consist of three pillars, regulative, normative and 
cognitive forces. These institutions are linked to both collective activities and governmental policies 
and individual behaviors (Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, Mueller & Melewar, 2001). Noting the 
importance of institutions, Dunning (2009) argues that a country needs to adopt or upgrade institutions 
and institutional infrastructure to advance its comparative dynamic advantage. The current study 
focuses on the impact of government-level nationalism as reflected by its policies, paralleling North’s 
formal institutions, and Scott’s regulative institutions. This set of institutions is key discriminating 
factors of FDI success (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010). 
A country’s institutional environment influences the success of a foreign firm’s cross-border 
acquisition because the environment reflects the “rules of the game” by which it enters and operates in 
a given market (Scott, 1995). Economic nationalism is one of the key institutional factors that exert 
impacts on firms’ FDI. However, existing economic nationalism studies largely treat nationalism as the 
explanatory problem (explanandum) while ignoring its explanatory function (explanans) (Pickel, 2002 
& 2003). As an effort to fill this knowledge gap, this research seeks to examine the explanatory power 
of economic nationalism on cross-border acquisition completion. We develop a conceptual model 
(Figure 1) based on political literatures and institutional theory (Abdelal, 2005; Baughn & Yaprak, 
1996; Chen, 2005; Johnson, 1965; Ning, 2009; North, 1990; Pickel, 2002). 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
As a subset of institutions, economic nationalism comprises two aspects: informal (ideology of 
nationalism) and formal constrains (policies, regulations). The political literature indicates that policies 
and regulations in light of nationalism largely follow the ideology, and both work to influence 
economic activities (Beland & Lecours, 2005; Johnson, 1965). Our empirical analysis focuses on the 
effects of the policies derived from nationalistic ideology on inward acquisition completion.   
As we have argued economic nationalism is unnecessarily related with protectionism in nature. 
Pragmatic nationalism is national-interest driven. Its orientation to world affairs is seeking and 
defending national interests, particularly national security and territorial integration (Zhao, 2000). 
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Directed by this pragmatism, the ideology of economic nationalism possesses the elements of both 
protectionism and liberalism, which shape the national policy. For example, to achieve national 
prosperity, countries develop formal institutions such as competition policies to improve their 
comparative advantages by attracting FDI and/or engaging in international markets (Dunning, 2009). 
We follow the concept of nationalizing mechanism by Pickel (2002) to gain a better understanding of 
how economic nationalism functions in influencing inward FDI. The nationalizing mechanism, which 
subsumes economic nationalism, is a crucial social process in current global transformations. With the 
state as the central actor, it looks to legitimate changing economic and political systems, and to 
facilitate their economic and political integration regionally and globally. Therefore a state’s policy 
and actions reflect how it copes with internal legitimation and external integration in a collective way, 
since economic nationalism works as a set of policies that follow the national objectives and directions 
(Abdelal, 2005). Following this logic, we conclude that the economic nationalism functions 
collectively through the domestic policy and foreign relations for the nation’s economic development 
and security. Consequently, our empirical model focuses on three important aspects of economic 
nationalism, i.e. national security, foreign relations and national growth strategy. National security 
emphasizes a country’s sovereignty including economic safety (Jiang, 2007). Foreign relations, as 
outcomes of foreign policy to serve national interests by creating a safe environment for the nation, 
influence inbound FDI from nations that have diplomatic relations with the host (Chen, 2005; Ning, 
2009). National growth strategy includes three key economic policies, i.e. industrial policy, technology 
policy, and FDI policy, all of which aim to enhance a country’s economic prosperity. We suggest that 
all these three components have impacts on inbound M&A success. 
To convert the conceptual model into an empirical model, we develop a set of testable hypotheses by 
using the case of China. A transitional economy and the largest FDI recipient (Peng, 2006), China’s 
experience reflects the dynamic nature of economic nationalism and provides a perfect lab to examine 
how economic nationalism impacts inbound FDI completion. Since the late 1970s, China’s economic 
nationalism has been shifted from simple and defensive protection of domestic businesses to greater 
international visibility. In Maoist anti-imperialist nationalism, foreign capitalists were clearly viewed 
as enemies, and “self-reliance” was watchword. After 1978, autarky was abandoned, and the economic 
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nationalism transformed from nativism to pragmatism (Zhao, 2000). Chinese leaders recognize that 
China’s economic advancement depends heavily on integration with the rest of the world. To achieve 
modernization, political leaders initiated a unique path of reform and openness to engage China in the 
world economy. China’s economic nationalism was then partially reflected by some liberal actions like 
welcoming FDI, joining WTO, and encouraging domestic companies’ outbound FDI (Crane, 1999). In 
the transition, the integrative nationalism becomes a central element in China’s external nationalizing 
mechanism (Pickel, 2002)
2
. China is very careful and takes a gradualist approach in its participation in 
the world economy. So China’s openness is not without reservation; when an inbound acquisition 
concerns national security or national growth strategy, economic nationalism may arise. Certain 
government agencies play an important role in M&A control through enforcing laws and regulations, 
and reviewing and approving deals. The decision depends on the structure of the deal, the nature of the 
target and the industrial sector, and the value of the transaction.  
National security considerations 
An essential element of nationalism is the actions that a nation takes in seeking to achieve or sustain 
sovereignty (e.g. Gellner, 1983; Miller, 2000). National security is the primary concern of a 
government. Serving the national interest, many governments use national security as the mandate to 
be of protectionism and oppose takeovers of domestic firms by foreigners, even when the shareholders 
are in support. Perceived national security threats can lead national review agencies to turn to 
protectionism and then quash deals. Many countries carefully regulate and screen foreign investments, 
ensuring that the foreign investments are in the national interests. The government will prohibit or 
restrict foreign investment in sectors it considers as crucial to national security. An acquisition deal 
targeting a local company with operations that have national security or national interest implications 
such as those involving military production, crucial infrastructure, or energy and other scarce natural 
resources, is more likely to be obstructed by political forces. In China, State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) defines seven industries as “vital 
                                                        
2 Because it is an explanans, economic nationalism is as a part of a theoretical framework that can tie together processes of 
economic change at global and national levels. Pickel (2002) defines the general process at the center of this framework as 
the nationalizing mechanism, which is the culturally grounded process of internal and external integration or disintegration of 
national political economies and societies. China is in the process of integration into the global economy, but it takes a careful 
and gradual approach towards the integration. 
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industrial and crucial fields that relate to national security and the life line of national economy”, 
including war industry, power grid and power, petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation 
and shipping (Xinhuan News, 2006)
3
. We expect that acquiring a firm in these industries may face 
more obstacles:   
Hypothesis 1: An acquisition deal in industries related to national security is less likely to be 
completed than the deals in other industries. 
Being of liberalism China allows foreign investors to participate in the restructuring and privatization 
of SOEs. However the politicians still continue emphasizing the central role of public ownership in 
national economy. The fundamental reason for advocating public ownership and the persistent 
dominance of SOEs lies in the Party leadership’s fear of losing control over the country’s economy 
(Narayanan, 2006). In addition, Chinese politicians view increasing share of crucial products and 
services by SOEs as related to national security. Furthermore, in recent years, in order to enhance 
Chinese companies’ global competitiveness and the national reputation, Chinese government takes the 
“national champions” strategy, promoting leading SOEs in such sectors considered as important to 
economic security by granting financial support, regulatory privileges, and protection. Therefore, 
privatization in China does not mean abandoning protectionism, and the hurdle of acquiring a SOE by 
a foreign company is higher than that for other targets
4
. In practice, although the foreign capital has 
aggressively participated in privatization of SOEs via M&A (Lin, 2008), acquiring SOEs ends up with 
low success rate. On the contrary, the transaction for a private target is more likely to be determined by 
the market, based on the will of private sellers and buyers, and less complicated by the government 
and public opinion.
5
 These arguments lead to the following hypotheses.   
                                                        
3 http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-12/18/content_5502762.htm 
4 In its new anti-monopoly law coming into effect in August 2008, China provides additional protection for SOEs that are 
“relied upon by the national economy and national security” with respect to competition rules (see Anti-Monopoly Law, 
Article 7). 
5 In this research we focus on SOE and private targets to identify the government’s influence in the context of nationalism. 
SOEs are defined as firms that are controlled by the government which owns 50% or more of shares. Private firms are 
without government involvement, because they are owned by individuals or have a private parent of less than 50% share 
which is not traded on a public exchange. Other types of targets, such as public firms (companies whose total or a majority of 
share is publicly traded and are without a majority parent), joint ventures (firms that have two or more parents), and 
subsidiaries (organizations whose non-government parents own 50% or more of the share, and is not publicly traded), have 
too complicated ownership structures to clarify the influences by the state, their direct parents and ultimate parents. To test 
our hypotheses, these targets were treated as a reference group in opposition to SOE targets (Models 2 and 3) or private 
targets (Models 1 and 3). 
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Hypothesis 2a. An acquisition of an SOE target is less likely to be completed than other targets.  
Hypothesis 2b. An acquisition of a private target is more likely to be completed than other targets. 
Foreign relations 
The nationalists identify a foreign country as threatening their national identity and security not only 
with its power, but also with how the two countries have interrelated politically and historically 
(Abdelal, 2005). Nationalism is a fundamental force in influencing Chinese foreign policy (Zhu, 2001). 
The fundamental goals of China’s foreign policy include preserving its independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, creating a favorable international environment for its reform and opening-up and 
modernization
6
. From the perspective of political risk, IB studies have investigated the impact of 
political stability and bilateral foreign relations on business (e.g. Li & Vashchilko, 2010; Loree & 
Guisinger, 1995; Sethi, Guisinger, Phelan & Berg 2003; and see Henisz, Mansfield & Von Glinow 
2010 for an extensive review). Scholars contend that states of good relations should engage more 
economic exchanges than those of poor relations (Davis & Meunier, 2011, Zhang, Witteloostuijn & 
Elhorst, 2011). A good diplomatic relation, for example, friendly high-level visits from an investing 
country would improve the country’s acknowledgment in China. We expect that an MNE from a 
country that has good foreign relations with China would find it easier to be recognized and accepted. 
Therefore we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: A cross-border acquisition is more likely to be completed if an acquirer is from a 
country with good foreign relation with China. 
Growth strategy 
An ideology of nationalism reflected in economic domain, China has adopted an ‘opening’ or liberalist 
policy as its long-term fundamental state policy since 1979 based on such a notion that China’s 
economic development depends heavily on integration with the world economy. Generally China 
welcomes FDI as part of its economic ideology.   
However, foreign investors are not evenly welcomed across industries depending on their fit with the 
country’s growth strategy, where we can clearly see the role played by the dynamic interaction of 
                                                        
6 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/ 
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protectionism and liberalism. Here we investigate three particular policies: FDI policy, technology 
policy, and industrial policy. 
FDI Policy. Basically, one can expect that a cross-border acquisition deal in an industry which is 
widely open to foreign investors is easier to complete than a deal in a less open industry. We gauge the 
industrial openness with the percentage of FDI in an industry, and suggest that the higher FDI share is 
in an industry, the more open this industry is. However, the relationship between industry openness 
and FDI’s likelihood of completion is unnecessarily linear due to the interaction between 
protectionism and liberalism. The nation opens up industries to FDI to boost technological 
development, managerial efficiency and industrial growth in favor of liberalism. Once the FDI share in 
an industry increases to a certain level, domestic concerns might grow fearing that foreign companies 
dominate the national market and thus threaten national economic security (Borgonjon & Sinclair, 
2006). This may turn a liberalist FDI policy into a protectionist one. In recent years, many foreign 
M&A attempts target leading Chinese firms in sectors including beverage, cosmetics, electronics, 
automobiles, petrochemicals and machinery. These have aroused close attention of Chinese scholars 
and politicians, who are concerned that once foreign companies establish a monopoly in these 
industries, they will essentially manipulate Chinese market (Wang, 2007). Protecting the industry from 
being controlled by foreign hands is a common reason that authorities reject the deals. This implies a 
certain level of FDI share, beyond which success rate of cross-border acquisitions will decrease. 
Following this logic, we propose: 
Hypothesis 4: Given the effects from both FDI policy and national security, there is an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between FDI share and the likelihood that a cross-border acquisition attempts 
is completed.  
Technology policy. Chinese economic nationalism advocates the enhancement of the national economy 
by introducing modern production and management practices and skills into China that local firms can 
learn and benefit from in light of liberalism (Deng, 1978). Capital and external knowledge can be 
acquired through developing key business relationships (Dieleman & Sachs, 2008; Yli-Renko, Autio 
& Sapienza 2001). Cross-border acquisition is one channel to establish business relation with foreign 
firms. Although FDI policy and other FDI related industrial policies have been amended several times 
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in the past, encouraging technology transmission via FDI remains a focus of these policies, and it is 
much more so in recent years in consistence with the fundamental objectives of attracting FDI. 
Moreover, China has been changing its growth strategy from an export- and investment- driven 
economy to a consumption- and quality-driven one to achieve long-term sustainable national 
prosperity. To meet this end, the government advocates the industrial upgrading by promoting the 
development of high-tech industries. FDI is considered as an important instrument to pursue this goal, 
and consequently is encouraged to flow into the high-tech sectors under the dominant liberalism. 
Therefore, we expect that:   
Hypothesis 5: An acquisition in high- tech industry is more likely to be completed than a deal in other 
industries. 
Industrial Policy. Another measurement to enhance the national economy relates to the need of capital 
for development. One of the key purposes of attracting FDI is to fill the capital gap typical for an 
emerging economy like China as suggested in the ‘two-gap’ model (Chenery & Strout, 1966; 
McKinnon, 1966; Wang, 2007; Weisskopf 1972), and the mobilization of domestic savings and foreign 
capital are needed to generate sufficient investment to accelerate the process of national development. 
Inward acquisition could be a quick way for the host country to raise the capital it needs as advocated 
by the liberalists. Therefore, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 6: An acquisition in a capital demanding industry is more likely to be completed than a 
deal in other industries.  
Foreign investors is often expected to provide to a host country a commercially viable package 
consisting of superior process and product technology supported by appropriate organizational and 
managerial capacities (Henley & Kirkpatrick, 1999). The host country can benefit from FDI via 
improving efficiency in some traditional industries as liberalism would suggest. Selling inefficient 
firms to foreign investors could be one solution to avoid job loss and increase social instability. 
Following this nationalistic goal, FDI is not only allowed but encouraged to participate in the 
restructuring of those ailing firms. Therefore, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 7: An acquisition in a poorly performing industry is more likely to be completed than a 
deal in other industries. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The sample of this study is 7,275 cross-border acquisitions that occurred during the period of 
1985-2010, accessed via the Thomason Financial Merger & Acquisition database. The acquirers are 
from 76 countries with a majority (71%) in HK
7
, Japan, US and Europe. This database offers valuable 
information of the deal statue, dates of announcement and completion of the transaction, and some 
attributes of the targets and acquirers such as ownership, industry, and sought percentage. To ensure 
the accuracy of the information, we used Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe database for double check. 
The data of investment risk are from the PRS Group’s Institutional Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
assessments (http://www.prsgroup.com), and the information of foreign relations is obtained from 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese embassies, and Xinhua News Agency. Industry-level 
data are from Emerging Markets Information Service (EMIS) database of CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
The detailed sources for each variable can be found in Table 1. 
Dependent variable  
Acquisition completion is operationalized as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
announced acquisition attempt is completed and 0 otherwise. 
Key explanatory variables  
In line with our hypotheses, we choose a set of explanatory variables capturing economic nationalism 
factors. Security indicates whether a target is in the industries that are national security-related 
according to the SASAC, including war industry, power grid and power, petrochemical, 
telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping (Xinhuan News, 2006). We code it as 1 if it falls 
into these categories and 0 otherwise.  
SOE target and Private target, coded as dummies, refer to the ownership of target firms. We code SOE 
target as 1 if an acquisition target is an SOE, and 0 if otherwise. Private target takes the value of 1 
                                                        
7 Although HK returned to China in 1997, we keep the samples from HK in the models for five reasons. First, despite the 
transfer of sovereignty from the UK to China in 1997, HK enjoys a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative 
region (SAR) in all areas but defence and foreign affairs under the principle of “one country, two systems”. Officially, 
investment from HK is classified as foreign investment, which is subject to all FDI regulations. Second, HK has been 
excluded in the models (model 3 and 4) that estimate the effects of foreign relations. Therefore the political relation change in 
1997 does not skew the result. Third, we did robust test by dropping the samples from HK in model 1 and 2. Similar results 
were obtained (available upon request), implying that the samples from HK do not skew the result. Four, we include a 
dummy variable, HK, to control for the effect from the special economy. Finally, we did a robustness test by dropping 
samples from HK in Models 1 and 2, and the estimation results do not change much (results available upon request). 
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when the target company is privately owned, and 0 if otherwise.  
Foreign relation measures bilateral foreign relations between China and the investing country based 
on the diplomatic events that happened between Chinese government and investing countries’ 
governments. Following Goldstein (1992), daily events are weighted and aggregated into annual 
numbers for each investing country. We employ high-level visits to China to gauge the variable. We 
apply the weighting method by Zhang, Witteloostuijn and Elhorst (2011). The heads of states’ visit is 
weighted by 2 and the influential politicians’ visit by 1. The higher the value is, the better is the 
foreign relation. 
FDI share denotes the share of foreign capital in an industry, and is measured by the ratio of foreign 
equity to total equity in an industry. This variable demonstrates to what extent the industry is open to 
foreign investors, and the level of foreign dominance in the sector. To test the inverted U-shaped 
relationship highlighted by H4, we also include its squared term, FDI share
2
. 
High tech indicates whether a target is in high-tech industry (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). We use 
AeA's 45 SIC codes list
8
, measured at the four-digit level, to identify these industries. 
Capital denotes the demandingness of capital in an industry. A high Capital indicates the industry 
demands more capital. It is measured by the total capital invested in an industry divided by the number 
of firm in the industry. 
Loss share indicates the percentage of companies in loss in an industry. It is calculated by the number 
of money-losing firms divided by the total number of companies in that industry.   
Control variable 
We included a number of control variables that may be linked to acquisition completion. Sought 
percentage is the percentage of ownership stake of a target sought by the acquirer in a transaction. The 
higher this factor is, the more likely it is at stake for the acquirer’s and target’s shareholders, which 
may affect both sides’ approval (Dikova, Sahib & Witteloostuijn, 2010) and make it more difficult to 
complete. When there is a high sought percentage, the transaction becomes more sensitive to interest 
groups, including stakeholders of the target and the acquirer, and even the competitors and 
                                                        
8 http://www.techamerica.org/sic-definition 
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cooperators. 
Investment risk is an assessment of factors affecting the risk of investment, ranging from 0 to 12. The 
risk rating is the sum of three components (Contract Viability/Expropriation, Profits Repatriation, and 
Payment Delays), each ranging from 0 to 4. A score of 12 equates to Very Low Risk, and 0 refers to 
Very High Risk (PRS Group, 2007). We expect that when the investment risk increases, the deal 
completion becomes harder to achieve. 
Finally we develop three dummy variables, HK, US and Japan, to control for the country/region 
specific effect by these three areas and Europe
9
 (treated as a reference group in the models). We do 
this for two reasons. First, these four economies are different from each other and from other 
economies in terms of culture, economy and politics, hence the investment behaviors and strategies of 
firms from these economies are different (e.g. Park & Lee, 2003). Second, they are homes of major 
acquiring investors in China, which account for 71% of total cross-border acquisitions in China.   
(INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE) 
Estimation 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression to analyze the determinants 
of acquisition attempt outcomes. The logit model is represented as follows: 
]1/[1)( )(iXeiP     (1) 
where P ( i ) is the probability of acquisition i being completed; e  is the exponential function; 
X ( i ) is the vector of independent variables, including the key explanatory variables and control 
variables listed above; and β is the regression coefficients for the vector of independent variables X 
( i ). The explanatory power of the logit model is determined using the likelihood ratio test.  
To analyze the changes taking place during the investigating period, we choose two years, 2001 and 
2003, as benchmarks. First, we split data into two periods: 1985-2001 and 2002-2010, to estimate the 
changes before and after China’s entry into WTO. Second, we compare the two periods: 1984-2003 
and 2004-2010 because 2003 is the year when the first piece of Chinese legislation governing 
                                                        
9 This study includes following European countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland Rep, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Fed, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, 
Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. 
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cross-border acquisition, namely the Provisional Rules on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (hereafter the 2003 Provisional Rules), was enacted. One of this 
legislation’s goals is to maintain “national economic security”. It brings all cross-border acquisitions to 
the review procedure. Exemption from such review can only be granted when the transaction: 1) “can 
improve the conditions for fair competition in the market”; 2) “can restructure a loss-making 
enterprise and safeguard employment”; 3) “introduces advanced technology and management 
personnel and enhances the international competitiveness of the enterprise”; or 4) “can improve the 
environment”.10 By comparing the differences before and after the enforcement of the legislation, we 
will be able to tell if the institutions influence cross-border acquisitions in China. To do this, we also 
include the industrial-level data. Due to limited availability of industrial data, we compare 1985-2003 
and 2004-2009.  
In addition, to understand to what extent the obstacles can be attributed to economic nationalism, we 
carry out an additional estimation by using domestic M&A data. The samples of this estimation 
included 17,654 domestic acquisitions that occurred during the period of 1990-2010, from the 
Thomason Financial Merger & Acquisition Database. The definition of the variables and estimation 
model are the same as those in cross-border acquisition case. The only difference is that we include 
two ownership variables, SOE acquirer and Private acquirer, to examine if the ownership of domestic 
acquirers matters in deal completion
11
; and we included two interaction terms, Security*SOE and 
Security*Private acquirer to estimate the moderating effect of ownership of acquirers. The purpose of 
adding the two new variables and interaction terms is to distinguish how national security sentimental 
reacts differently to foreign acquirers, domestic state-own acquirers and domestic private acquirers. 
4. RESULTS  
Table 2 presents a standard summary of statistics and correlations. We do not observe high correlation 
between repressors.
12
 The logistic regression model results are presented in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 
include a constant, control variables and independent variables related to national security and 
                                                        
10 See Article 22 in the 2003 Provisional Rules. 
11 We do not include acquirer’s ownership into the previous estimation because there are few SOE acquirers in foreign 
acquisition case. 
12 We have also examined the correlation with all sub-group samples, which is available upon request. We do not observe 
high correlation between repressors for all models.  
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high-tech industries based on a full sample of 7,275 observations. Based on Model 1 and 2, we add 
foreign relation into Models 3 and 4. Since the foreign relations are not applicable between Mainland 
China and areas such as Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, the observations reduce to 4,292 after 
dropping those of these economies. To test the hypotheses, we need to test the effect of SOE targets 
with non-SOE targets as the reference group, and to test the effect of private targets with non-private 
targets as the reference group. Therefore, we introduce the two ownership variables separately into 
Models 1-4. In Model 4a, the two ownership variables are included simultaneously. The reference 
group of this model is those who are neither SOE targets nor private targets. Models 5 and 6 are 
replications of Model 2 using data of 1985-2001, and 2002-2010 respectively. We further add 
industry-level predictors reflecting growth strategy into Models 7, 8, and 9. This variable is only 
available within the manufacturing sectors with a SIC code between 20 and 38, so the observations 
drop to 2,968. In addition, 716 out of 780 (92%) high-tech deals are in the sector with a SIC code of 
73, which is not in the observations of manufacturing sectors. The only set of high-tech deals in 
manufacturing is the SIC code of 29, which is petroleum and coal products. According to the SASAC 
definition, petroleum and coal products are an industry of national economic security, which has been 
included in security variable (Hypothesis 1) already. Therefore we do not include high-tech in Models 
7-9.  
We report the coefficients, standard error, value of the likelihood function at convergence and the 
likelihood-ratio chi-square in each model. The chi-square statistic is significant at 1% level in all 
models, which suggests that the models with explanatory variables and control variables fit better than 
a model only with the constant.  
(INSERT TABLE 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE) 
Security has significantly negative influence on acquisition success in Models 1-6, supporting H 1. 
The insignificance of its effect in Model 7- 9 can be explained by including the industry-level data. As 
mentioned above, the industrial data only cover the manufacturing sectors with SIC codes of 20-38. 
All industries considered being of economic security, excluding petrochemical, are not included, 
leaving only 5% of deals related to national security included in the estimations. With 95% of deals in 
the seven industries excluded, the estimations could be biased because of the unrepresentative data. 
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Therefore, the insignificance in these three models should not weaken the explanatory power of 
Security. SOE target is negatively and significantly linked to acquisition success in all relevant models 
(Models 2 and 4), providing support to H 2a, suggesting that a deal with a SOE target faces more 
stringent constraints. SOE target becomes insignificant when we include Private target in Model 4a 
with the reference group as those targets that are neither SOEs nor private firms. A possible reason 
could be that part of these targets in reference group are not completely free from government 
intervention, especially target firms with share, even though minority, owned by the government. 
Another reason can be that some targets have parent(s) or shareholders whose interferences complicate 
and deter the acquisition process. These complexities require further study. Private target is positively 
related to acquisition success (p<0.01), supportive to H 2b, suggesting a deal with a private target 
faces less obstacles than a deal with other target.  
Foreign relation has a positive effect (p<0.1) on acquisition success in all models, in support to H 3. 
Concerning the explanatory variables related to growth strategy, the coefficient of FDI share is 
positive (p<0.01), and the coefficient for its squared term is negative (p<0.01) as well, showing an 
inverted U-shape relationship between the FDI share and the acquisition success, consistent with H 4. 
High-tech is significantly positively related to acquisition success in all models except Model 5, 
partially supporting H 5. Capital’s effect is significantly positive in Model 7 and 8, in partial support 
of H 6. Finally, loss share has significantly positive linkage to acquisition success in Model 7 and 9, 
but not in Model 8, also partially supporting H 7.  
In line with our expectation, the control variable sought percentage is negatively and significantly 
related to acquisition success in Model 1, 3, 5, and 8. Not surprisingly, investment risk is significantly 
positively associated with acquisition success in all models, indicating the importance of investment 
environment for a successful acquisition. Strikingly, HK has a significantly negative coefficient in 
Model 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 9, indicating that acquisitions by Hong Kong investors tend to be unsuccessful. 
This certainly has implications for future research. US and Japan also have significantly negative 
impact on acquisition success in Model 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, implying that acquirers from US and Japan 
face more obstacles than those from other areas such as Europe.  
The results of the estimation with domestic acquisition are presented in Table 4. The coefficient of 
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Security is negative and significant, and the coefficient of Private target is positive and significant, in 
line with the result in cross-border acquisition case. The coefficient of SOE target is positive and 
significant, which is opposite to the estimation with cross-border acquisition case in Table 3. The 
interaction term Security*SOE has positive and significant coefficient, and the coefficient of 
Security*Private acquirer is insignificant, revealing that Chinese SOE acquirers are more likely to be 
successful in conducting acquisition in security-related industries. 
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Our empirical analysis above provides evidence that economic nationalism influences cross-border 
acquisition completion in China at least through three channels: national security consideration, 
foreign relations with home countries, and national growth strategy. In this section, we provide further 
analysis and finding from dynamic and ownership perspectives, and discussion on generalizability of 
the findings.  
Changes over time 
In the past 30 years, China has strived to rebuild its nation from the past ruin; the rise of economic 
nationalism is evident in both the country’s ruling party’s discourse and economic policies. The 
recurring themes are centered on nationalistic values such as national unity, identity, autonomy, 
prestige, and prosperity of the nation as reflected by the dynamic interaction of protectionism and 
liberalism. In our empirical study, we observe the changes of China’s attitude to FDI into high-tech 
industries, the appetite for foreign capital and industrial performance.  
Attitude to foreign investment into high-tech industries. As reported in Table 3, high-tech has 
significantly positive impact on acquisition completion in models with full set of data. But the 
significance of the impact only exists for 2002-2010 when we split the data into two periods, 
1985-2001 and 2002-2010. This may result from the more liberalist efforts in promoting and 
expressive encouragement from the central government for cross-border acquisitions in high-tech 
sectors after 2001. For example, an important objective of China’s 10th Five Year Plan for 2001-2005 
was to improve the competitiveness of its high-tech sectors by increasing overall spending on R&D, 
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particularly on prioritized “pillar industries” and key strategic technologies13. It encouraged FDI to tap 
into cutting-edge and technology-oriented industries, such as electronic information, bioengineering, 
new materials and aviation and aerospace. In addition, the 2003 Provisional Rules explicitly stipulate 
that cross-border acquisition deals introducing advanced technology can be granted exemption from 
the review procedure. The empirical results reflect certain outcomes of these new institutions. Our 
findings reveal different attitudes to inward acquisitions in high-tech sectors between China and other 
countries. Many countries consider the possession of technology as an essential national advantage, 
and tend to protect their key high–tech sectors from being acquired by foreign firms (e.g. Graham & 
Marchick 2006). However, China as a later comer seems to open its high-tech industries to foreign 
investment to cultivate its advantage.  
Changed appetite for capital. Our findings suggest that capital’s influence is significant, but the 
sub-sample estimations indicate that it is significant in the period of 1985-2003, not in the later period, 
implying that the appetite for capital brought in by FDI changed over time. After years’ opening up 
and development, China has accumulated massive capital that gradually fills the capital gap illustrated 
in the two-gap model. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China had pooled more than 500 
billion USD in FDI by the end of 2003
14
. This fuels the debate about the role of FDI in China. Many 
protectionists and activists argue that China does not lack capital to sustain its economic growth. 
Foreign M&A could bear the brunt of this domestic resistance. Consequently, after 2003, the capital 
demand is not a significant factor influencing the deal completion in our study.  
Industrial performance. We observed that loss share works significantly in the period of 2004-2009, 
but not in 1985-2003. This indicates that cross-border acquisitions were completed more easily in a 
poorly performing industry than a healthy industry after 2003. This result may be partially attributed to 
the 2003 Provisional Rules, the first piece of legislation governing cross-border M&A in China. The 
Rules explicitly stipulate that an exemption from security review can be granted where the transaction 
“can restructure a loss-making enterprise and safeguard employment” to ensure the national security 
from the perspective of employment and social stability. Our empirical results seem to support the 
                                                        
13 http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content_245624.htm 
14 Source: China Ministry of Commerce, 2004; China Foreign Direct Investment, 2004. 
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effect of this regulation from a liberalist approach. 
In addition, the confirmed inverted U-shape relationship between FDI share and success rate of inward 
acquisitions also shows the attitude toward FDI could change over time given the dynamic interplay of 
liberalism and protectionism due to the fear of dominant foreign ownership in industries. 
To what extent the obstacles can be attributed to economic nationalism 
One may argue that domestic firms, particular private owned, may also face obstacle in acquiring 
another domestic firm that is national security-related. Therefore, we need to be clear to what extent 
the obstacles underpinned by nationalism are specific to foreign acquirers. The estimation results from 
Table 4 answer this question.  
First, SOE target has significantly positive relationship with acquisition completion, implying that 
acquiring a SOE faces less constrains than acquiring firms of other ownerships, in opposition to the 
findings with cross-border acquisitions. This divergence reflects the dynamic reform in China, one key 
element of which is re-devising of SOEs ownership structure. Since the 1990s, new regulations began 
to allow more and more SOEs to be leased or sold to the public and employees in order to increase 
their efficiency and competitive advantage. The number of SOEs has reduced sharply, with a 
percentage of SOE in industrial output falling from 65% in 1985 to 10% in 2009
15
. Most of SOEs have 
been restructured through domestic M&A. Therefore reshuffling SOEs is a part of Chinese reform, 
and there is no strict review process required for domestic buyers. However, the security review 
remains a complex process for foreign investors. The different outcomes between domestic and 
foreign acquisitions provide extra evidence that supports the existence and effects of economic 
nationalism on foreign acquisition of SOEs. 
Second, security industry is significantly and negatively linked to acquisition completion, implying 
that acquiring a firm in an industry related to national security is more protected and thus more 
difficult than that in other industries for local players, comparable to their foreign counterparts. 
Moreover, we find that the completions are different between domestic SOEs and private firms by 
testing the moderate effect of ownership on security industry. The results indicate that, when private 
                                                        
15 Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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acquirer does not work as a moderator, SOE acquirer has a significant and positive moderating effect 
on security industry, implying that state ownership make a successful acquisition in security industries 
easier. By comparing both cross-border and domestic acquisitions, we conclude that both foreign and 
domestic acquirers except SOEs face a high fence in completing M&A in security related industries. 
Therefore, economic nationalism again plays a role in acquisitions in security industries.    
The generalizability of the findings  
The uniqueness of nations’ formal institutions and the complex nature of China's transitional economy 
and political considerations may limit the generalizability of our empirical findings. However, 
economic nationalism is prevalent across the world, and seeking to attract FDI is not so much a 
China-specific phenomenon. Our research still provides applicable and helpful insights to other 
contexts. First, security concern in relation to FDI is widely perceived in both developing and 
developed countries; China is just one among around 90 countries that apply regulatory scrutiny 
procedure to cross-border M&A (Singh, 2002). The regulatory scrutiny gives special attention to 
industries that are related to national security. For example, US governments requires transactions 
involving regulated industries (e.g. energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications 
and media, financial institutions and defense contracting) should prepare for extra layer of approvals 
by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz , 2008). Second, SOEs exist in nearly all countries despite their different social nature. SOEs are 
often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries whose performance is of great importance to 
broad segments of the population and to other parts of the business sectors (OECD, 2005). Therefore 
the resistant force against M&A of SOE targets may be prevalent everywhere. Third, diplomatic 
activities are wildly used as a tool to enhance economic exchange (Lee & Hudson, 2004). Most of 
countries use business diplomacy as one of the main elements of diplomatic policies. Governments 
allocate diplomatic resources to make business activities more concentrated, hence to extend the 
diplomatic business scope (Lee & Hudson, 2004). Governments are likely to become business 
cooperators. In this case, our finding about foreign relations’ effects can be interpreted in a more 
generalized sense. Fourth, many developing countries apply similar development-oriented FDI 
policies to pursue their own national objectives (UNCTAD, 2003), where conditions for foreign firms 
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are comparable to those in China. Fifth, developed countries also endeavor to attract FDI to underpin 
economic growth and employment. Currently, two reasons make economic nationalism become more 
important in these countries. The first one is current global crisis; the other is the rising of FDI from 
developing/transition countries. While not all the empirical findings of this study are applicable to the 
developed countries, the concept model is relevant due to the fact that the nationalizing mechanism 
applies in both developing and developed countries (Pickel, 2002). 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper focuses on an overlooked but important relationship in IB literature that economic 
nationalism may influence the success of an announced cross-border acquisition. We suggest that 
economic nationalism may be associated with both protectionism that discourages foreign investment, 
and liberalism that encourages the foreign investment. Economic nationalism, developed and adjusted 
according to a nation’s internal and external conditions when forming part of the national ideology, 
shapes and influences the national policies toward global market participation. When a foreign 
investment is perceived to threaten the economic security, protecting nationalism arises. When foreign 
investments benefit to host’s economic development, liberal nationalism gains ground. The findings of 
the study help us understand, from a perspective of economic nationalism, why cross-border 
acquisitions differ from their domestic counterparts in completion, why some cross-border acquisitions 
are more difficult to complete than others, how targets’ and their industrial attributes influence the 
cross-border acquisition success, and how the effects of relevant regulations/policies change over time 
as they evolve. 
This paper focuses on three economic nationalism elements, including national security concerns, 
foreign relations, and economic growth policy (i.e., industrial policy, technology policy, and FDI 
policy). China as the context, our findings show that, when an acquisition activity targets essential 
industries or a SOE, the nationalism becomes more of protectionism, and the acquisition is less likely 
to complete. When an acquirer is perceived to bring desired technology and/or capital (stipulated by 
China’s national regulations and policies), or expected to help restructure poorly performing firms, or 
the acquirer is from a country with good foreign relation with China, the acquisition will be considered 
as safe and helpful, and the acquisition is easier to complete. In addition, some effects may change 
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over time due to the changes of the economic and political situations and thus policies.  
Our theoretical approach and empirical results contribute to the literature in three major ways. First, 
our research offers new insights to IB literature by examining economic nationalism as one of the 
main institutional aspects encountered by MNEs in M&A. It adds to OLI model by exploring the 
degree to which economic nationalism impacts M&A success when the FDI location is chosen. It 
confirms OLI’s claim that economic nationalism is an influential factor among other national 
characteristics when MNEs consider the international presence for markets, national resources, ways 
to increase efficiency and strategic assets (Dunning, 1998). Furthermore, it provides a new and 
superior perspective over simplified dichotomy of protectionism and liberalism on exploring the 
mechanisms how a host country’s institutions impact the likelihood to complete an inbound 
cross-border acquisition over the past.  
Second, our study enriches the development of a dynamic view of institution theory by investigating 
the evolving effects of nationalism on inward acquisition completion in China. In this sense, our 
analysis of the changing impacts of institutional factors extends institution theory, which focuses 
overly on static outcomes of institutions but neglects the dynamic mechanism.  
Third, the analysis of Chinese economic nationalism can be generalized to other developing countries, 
since many developing countries apply the similar development-oriented FDI policies to pursue their 
own national objectives (UNCTAD, 2003). Developed countries also endeavor to attract more 
investment via policy and promotional efforts. Nationalism concern rises in particular to the increasing 
FDI from transition economies, where our conceptual model may be applicable. 
Our findings provide some important managerial implications. Our study advances the traditional 
wisdom to provide measured effects of nationalism on international acquisition completion, and thus 
brings the awareness of the functioning economic nationalism to those MNEs that want to play in 
international arena. Our analysis shows that Chinese economic nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon, 
and its influence evolves over time given China’s transitional nature. In order to achieve economic 
development, China is on its way to be integrated into the world economy, and welcomes foreign 
investment. However, China’s protectionist policies remain powerfully applicable if necessary. Thus 
both liberalist and protectionist approaches work depending on the specific conditions of inbound 
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acquisitions. Accordingly although economic nationalism sometimes shows anti-foreign-acquisition 
sentiments, it does not always cause problems for foreign MNEs that intend to acquire domestic firms. 
When a cross-border acquisition fits the national growth strategy, economic nationalism shows 
positive impact on the activity. Therefore, being aware of the local nationalist attitudes and actions, 
understanding foreign relations between the China and their home country, and recognizing the host’s 
growth strategy/policies, are extremely important for successfully conducting cross-border 
acquisitions in China.   
Managers for international M&A are also advised to consider several tactical factors when acquiring in 
China. First, under current Chinese FDI policy, foreign investors may be better off to avoid the seven 
sensitive industries, including war industry, power grid and power, petrochemical, telecommunications, 
coal, civil aviation, and shipping as classified by SASAC, and Chinese SOEs. Second, a low profile 
attitude is recommendable for investors from a China- unfriendly home country such as USA and 
Japan. Third, targeting high-tech industries, and poorly performing companies, and shunning from 
foreign capital intensive sectors are also strategies to have successful M&A in China. There are more 
strategic considerations, for example to build the corporate image better, and adapt corporate structure 
and capability to cater for the changing needs of hosts (Wright & Ricks, 1994). 
Admittedly, economic nationalism is an under-researched area. More research efforts need to be put 
into investigating the nationalism – business relationship. First, though the conceptual model might be 
generalizable, the empirical tests of the study are based on the case of China. Researchers may be 
interested to explore the applicability of our empirical findings to other contexts including developing 
and developed economies. Second, we did not fully explore the rational link between the economic 
nationalist ideology and economic actions and the direct link between the ideology and cross-border 
acquisition. These links are important to understand the effects of economic nationalism, because 
those aspects of economic nationalism reflecting informal institutions (e.g. national sentiments) may 
also influence the outcomes of cross-border acquisitions. Third, MNEs’ entry strategy and acquisitions 
are not random. So they may be a self-selected method and there are other factors such as firm 
attributes and industrial conditions affecting the completion than merely the acquisition itself. Further 
research needs to address the self-selection issue. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual model 
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Table 1 overview of hypotheses, variables, estimations and measures 
Hypotheses Variables and 
expected sigh 
Estimation 
Result 
Measures Source 
H1  Security(-) Negative  
significant 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if an 
acquisition deal is in an industry that is national 
security-related according to the SASAC, and 0 
otherwise. 
Thomson 
Xinhuan News 18-12-2006  
H2a SOE target (-) Negative  
significant 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if a target 
is state owned enterprise and 0 if it is not 
Thomson 
H2b  Private target (+) Positive  
significant 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if a target 
is a private enterprise and 0 if it is not 
Thomson  
H3 Foreign relation (+) Positive  
significant 
Daily events as to high-level in visit to China are 
weighted and aggregated into annual numbers 
for each investing country. 
China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Chinese 
embassies, and Xinhua 
News Agency 
H4 FDI share (±) U-shaped 
relation 
The ratio of foreign equity to total equity in an 
industry. 
EMIS database of CEIC Data 
Company Ltd. 
H5 High tech (+) Positive 
significant 
Dummy variable with the value of 1 if a target 
is in high tech industry.  
Thomson,  AeA's 45 SIC 
codes list 
H6 Capital (+) Positive 
significant 
The total capital invested in an industry divided 
by the number of firm in the industry. 
EMIS database of CEIC Data 
H7 Loss share (+) Positive 
significant 
The percentage of companies in loss in an 
industry. 
EMIS database of CEIC Data 
Company Ltd. 
Control 
variables 
  
Sought percentage (-) Negative 
significant 
The percentage of the ownership stake sought 
by an acquirer  
Thomson 
Investment risk (+) Positive 
significant 
The score of investment risk The PRS Group’s 
Institutional Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) assessments 
(http://www.prsgroup.com) 
HK, US, Japan  Dummy variables for the three economies.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
  Obs Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 SOE target 7708 0.0785  0.2690  1           
2 Private target 7275 0.4170  0.4931  -0.2507*** 1          
3 Foreign relation 5769 1.2834  2.9103  0.0170 -0.0025 1         
4 FDI share 4584 0.2167  0.1939  -0.0117 -0.0902*** 0.0311 1        
5 High-tech 7275 0.1074  0.3096  -0.0530*** 0.0993*** 0.0119 -0.1608*** 1       
6 Capital 3361 0.0610  0.2312  -0.0104 0.0579*** -0.0588 -0.1794*** -0.0159 1      
7 Loss share 3561 0.1897  0.0593  0.0993*** -0.0633*** 0.1257*** 0.1380*** 0.1147*** -0.1409*** 1     
8 Sought percentage 11630 0.7404  0.4384  -0.0425*** 0.1817*** -0.0247 -0.0242 0.0515*** -0.0101 -0.0358  1    
9 Investment risk 11668 6.9838  0.7999  0.0136 0.0019 0.0683*** -0.0169 0.1046*** 0.0118 0.0050  -0.0977*** 1   
10 HK 11630 0.2513  0.4338  0.0835*** -0.0920*** -0.0324 -0.1084*** 0.0186 0.0386 0.0557*** -0.2325*** 0.0899*** 1  
11 US 11630 0.1278  0.3339  -0.0338 0.1280*** 0.0444*** 0.0246 0.0861*** -0.0119 -0.0164  -0.0087 0.0321*** -0.2000*** 1 
12 Japan  11630 0.0309  0.1730  -0.0059 -0.0460*** 0.0448*** 0.0381 -0.0097 0.0001 0.0273  -0.1427*** 0.0114 -0.1034*** -0.0616*** 
Note: *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3: Logit estimates of acquisition completion of cross-border acquirers in China, 1985-2010 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 4a Model 5 
1985-2001 
Model 6 
2002-2010 
Model 7 
Manufacturing 
Model 8 
Manufacturing 
1985-2003 
Model 9  
Manufacturing 
2004-2009 
Security -0.344*** -0.331*** -0.302** -0.296** -0.297** -0.367** -0.342*** -0.0646  0.0059  0.011 
 (0.0885) (0.0883) (0.1280) (0.1280) (0.1280) (0.1810) (0.1030) (0.2000) (0.3740) (0.2450) 
SOE target  -0.413***  -0.289** -0.127  -0.405** -0.252** -0.313** -0.469** -0.209  
  (0.0870)  (0.1240) (0.1280) (0.1770) (0.1060) (0.1500) (0.2380) (0.1960) 
Private target 0.482***  0.374***  0.358*** 0.284** 0.477*** 0.303*** 0.0882  0.390*** 
 (0.0508)  (0.0658)  (0.0677) (0.1170) (0.0591) (0.0852) (0.1670) (0.0998) 
Foreign relation   0.0169* 0.0170* 0.0171*      
   (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)      
FDI share        2.987*** 3.558* 3.227*** 
        (0.8590) (2.0810) (1.0080) 
FDI share2        -3.487*** -5.0730*  -3.487*** 
        (1.1330) (3.2290) (1.2890) 
High-tech 0.345*** 0.383*** 0.288*** 0.314*** 0.283** 0.149  0.367***    
 (0.0824) (0.0819) (0.1110) (0.1100) (0.1110) (0.1660) (0.0961)    
Capital        0.439** 0.868** 0.212  
        (0.1760) (0.3560) (0.2170) 
Loss share        2.546*** 1.961  2.043* 
        (0.7490) (1.7280) (1.0460) 
Sought percentage -0.139*** -0.0665  -0.136** -0.0572  -0.135** -0.705*** -0.0028  -0.0355  -0.107  -0.0029  
 (0.0506) (0.0497) (0.0678) (0.0660) (0.0679) (0.1150) (0.0572) (0.0820) (0.1570) (0.0966) 
Investment risk 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.141** 0.141** 0.140** 0.0864* 0.916*** 0.230*** 0.164   
 (0.0453) (0.0451) (0.0616) (0.0614) (0.0616) (0.0496) (0.1600) (0.0880) (0.1080)  
HK -0.622*** -0.629***    -0.622*** -0.648*** -0.434*** -0.571*** -0.389*** 
 (0.0563) (0.0561)    (0.1280) (0.0638) (0.0916) (0.1770) (0.1080) 
US -0.242*** -0.192*** -0.0811  -0.0528  -0.0811  -0.293* -0.222*** -0.116  -0.0832  -0.130  
 (0.0693) (0.0687) (0.0699) (0.0695) (0.0699) (0.1670) (0.0767) (0.1050) (0.2260) (0.1190) 
Japan -0.406*** -0.436*** -0.283** -0.310*** -0.285** -0.2490  -0.489*** -0.252  -0.677** -0.047 
 (0.1160) (0.1160) (0.1170) (0.1160) (0.1170) (0.2560) (0.1330) (0.1740) (0.2990) (0.2160) 
Constant -0.693** -0.507  -0.636  -0.504  -0.616  0.646* -6.109*** -2.119*** -1.246  -0.591** 
 (0.3260) (0.3240) (0.4400) (0.4390) (0.4410) (0.3800) (1.1340) (0.6540) (1.0290) (0.2620) 
Log likelihood  -4826.0  -4860.0  -2848.0  -2862.0  -2847.0  -993.2  -3781.0  -1898.0  -513.3  -1378.0  
LR chi2 286  217  61  34  62  86  280  84  33  54  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Number of observation 7275  7275  4290  4290  4290  1567  5708  2871  812  2059  
Note: a) Standard errors are shown in parentheses;  
b) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1
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Table 4: Logit estimates of acquisition completion of domestic acquirers in China, 1990-2010 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Security -0.291*** -0.272*** -0.183*** -0.217*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.057) (0.068) 
SOE target 0.714***  0.764*** 0.770*** 
 (0.155)  (0.163) (0.163) 
Private target  0.577*** 0.754*** 0.753*** 
  (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) 
Security*SOE acquirer    0.439* 
    (0.258) 
Security*Private acquirer    0.051  
    (0.133) 
SOE acquirer   0.527*** 0.478*** 
   (0.082) (0.087) 
Private acquirer   1.375*** 1.371*** 
   (0.036) (0.038) 
High-tech 0.396*** 0.320*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) 
Sought -0.00284*** -0.00270*** -0.00183*** -0.00183*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.181*** -0.328*** -0.860*** -0.857*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) 
Log likelihood  -11929.9 -11805.3 -11029.7 -11028.2 
LR chi2 130.71 379.86 1931.07 1933.97  
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of observation 17654 17654 17654 17654 
Note: a) Standard errors are shown in parentheses; 
     b) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; and * p<0.1 
